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THE WORDS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
Olivier Mor6teau* 
Abstract: While the word "comparative" refers to a cognitive and intellectual 
activity supposing that there are several elements to compare, the word "law" 
is used in the singular, as if law was to be compared to itself The whole phrase 
indicates that comparison takes place within the study of the law, but the use 
of the singular does not point to a pluralistic approach: what do we mean by 
law? Should we not talk about "comparing the laws" or "legal comparison"? 
With a reflection on the words of the law as a starting point, this paper 
visits the corpus ofcomparative law in a pluralistic perspective and the process 
as a basic element of cognition. Words of the comparatists are then visited in 
successive steps describing what they do: first the discovery of the foreign 
legal system with immersion in its language and culture yet keeping some 
outsider awareness to read the silence in language. Then comes the need to 
communicate on this other legal system, which is in essence an experience in 
translation. Based on what they learn, comparatists also build systems, using 
or developing common words in the various realms of international law, often 
for practical purposes. Last but not least, some aspire to develop neutral terms 
for the sake of knowledge in order to develop a specialty language of legal 
science. This latter activity tends to be neglected as a utopian aspiration. It 
encompasses the creation of precise terms and meta-categories. In any case, 
words are the tool of comparatists and therefore constantly evolve. 
Keywords: words; comparative law; pluralism; cultural immersion; 
translation, specialty language 
I. Introduction: Words of the Law 
Jurists trained in the Western legal traditions can hardly conceive of any form 
of legal activity without the instrumentality of words. Their ancestors honoured 
Themis - goddess of divine law, order and customs - represented as blindfolded 
and holding a sword, which would later change into words ("sword" became 
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"words" with "s" moving to the end). Except when considering taboos, which is 
the business of the anthropologist, the Western jurist is of the opinion that: "it is on 
the loom of language that all law is spun".' Whether the law is crafted by legislative 
or court language or doctrinal writing, or based on people's behaviour, it is rarely 
administered without the agency of human language and cannot be thought or 
described, comparatively or otherwise, without the instrumentality of words:2 the 
Westerner is of the opinion that "law is power dressed in words"3 and "when words 
fail, no law remains". 4 Section II of this paper will prove that this is not true: law 
can exist without words.5 The central point however will be to discuss the words 
that we use in comparing legal systems, whether or not we use words, gestures or 
combinations thereof 
In this regard, scholars mostly use terminology created by those who administer 
the law, though the history of Roman law and the civil law tradition shows that the 
language of scholarship can also shape legal practice. 6 The language of the law is 
a mix of everyday words and technical terms. Whether they create, administer or 
study the law, lawyers like to use ordinary words with a technical meaning like 
"fruit" and "cause" in the civil law, "breach" and "frustration" in the common law 
and "damages" and "constitution" in both, and occasionally invent complex words 
unlikely to be used outside some legal context, such as "antichresis", "emphyteusis" 
or "writ of certiorari". 7 
When writing his famous Bramble Bush in 1930, Karl Llewellyn pointed out 
our sins in using technical words: 
1 CG Weeramantry, Law in Crisis,Bridges of Understanding(London: Capemoss, 1975) p.133. 
2 Peter Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness ofComparativeLaw, trans. Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon,
9 2 9 4 1990) pp. - describes law as a creature of language. Annabelle Mooney, Language and Law (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) points to the unusual character of legal language, often called legalese: 
23. See also Harold J Berman, Law and Language, Effective Symbols of Community (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
3 Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to ComparativeLaw (Oxford: Hart, 2015) p.4 7 . 
4 Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of ComparativeLaw (n.2) p.93 insisting that without "I swear", 
there is no oath. "We speak of 'canonical forms of words', of 'constitutive' or 'effective' speech acts", 
citing JL Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1975) and 
John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory ofSpeech Acts (Cambridge University 
Press, 1979). See more recently Antonio Gambarro, "Law, Language and Meaning: The Performatives in 
a Multilingual Context" in Rodolfo Sacco (ed.), The NewAmbitions ofLegal Science:LegalAnthropology 
andLegal Traductology (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 2009) p.55 and Andrei Marmor, The 
12 2 2 Language ofLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. - . 
5 Rodolfo Sacco, Il diritto muto: Neuroscienze, conoscenza tacita, valori condivisi (Bologna: II Mulino, 
2015). 
6 See Helmut Coing, "The Roman Law as ius commune on the Continent" (1973) 89 LQR 505. 
7 I will not add "estoppel" to these latter category of terms because it comes from the French "estouper", 
meaning to plug, to close, and by extension prevent, and was also used inthe context of sexual intercourse: 
Frederic Godefroy, Dictionnairede l'ancienne languefrangaise, t de tous ses dialectes, du LMeme au 
XVeme siecle (Paris, 1884), vo estouper. See Olivier Moreteau, L'estoppel et laprotectionde la confiance 
legitime, Elements d'un renouveau du droit de la responsabilite(Droitanglaiset droitfrangais)(These, 
Lyon, 1990) p. 1 3 . 
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Legal usage of technical words has sinned, and does still, in two respects; 
it is involved in ambiguity of two kinds: multiple senses of the same term, 
and terms too broad to be precise in application to the details of single 
disputes. First, it does not use terms in single senses, but uses the same 
term in several senses; and in several senses, indiscriminately, without 
awareness. This invites confusion, it makes bad logic almost inevitable, 
it makes clear statement of clear thought difficult, it makes clear thought 
itself improbable. No logician worth his salt would stand for it; no scientist 
would stand for it.' 
This paper addresses the words used by legal scholars when engaging in comparative 
legal studies, assuming that they do not necessarily coincide with the terminology 
of the legal systems explored by the comparatist. 
The legal vocabulary is particularly rich, as for English alone, we count over 
25,000 entries in the Black's Law Dictionary.9 If we compare with the 171,476 
words in current use in the 1989, 20-volume edition of the Oxford English 
Dictionary, this would mean that approximately one word out of seven conveys a 
legal meaning. Though numerous, legal terms may not be sufficient in numbers or 
precision of meaning because lawyering and legal scholarship keep wrestling with 
polysemy. 
Llewelyn points his angry finger at polysemy, characterising it as a sin. Legal 
scholars may be sinning when they use technical terms such as "cause", meaning 
for the French causaor the reason why one enters into a contract, causation in the 
context of civil liability, case in the context of civil procedure. One also sins using 
"condition", meaning in the English common law context, a condition precedent 
or subsequent but also an essential term in a contract. We sin with the most general 
words like droit, which in civil law parlance means "law" in the general sense 
(droit objectif) or "right" in a more precise sense (droit subjectif), while "law" 
in a common law context may designate law in general, embracing statute law, 
common law, equity or combinations of these terms. English and French speakers 
are no doubt great sinners, but they are not the only ones. 
The Germans by contrast might qualify as saints, at least in the eyes of 
Llewellyn, who spent some of his young years in Germany" and brought some 
8 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, on Our Law andIts Study (New York: Oceana, 1978) p.83. George 
Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" George Orwell: Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
9 5 4 2003) p. rather criticised the "inflated style": Judith D Fischer, "Why George Orwell's Ideas About 
Language Skill Matter for Lawyers" (2007) 68 MontanaLaw Review 129. 
9 In its 10th edition (St Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2014) at the time of writing. The Preface to the 
7th edition (1999) reveals the addition of 4,500 entries to the 20,000 in previous editions. The Association 
Henri Capitant Vocabulairejuridique,by Gerard Cornu, counted over 10,000 entries in the 10th edition 
(Presses universitaires de France, 2014) p.vii, note 1. 
10 To which one may add 47,156 obsolete words, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/explore/ 
how-many-words-are-there-in-the-english-language/ (visited 26 March 2019). 
11 Arthur L Corbin, "A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn" (1962) 71 Yale LI 805. 
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civilian German concepts to the United States.' 2 Germans in general and German 
lawyers since the time of the Pandects 3 do not like polysemy, and avoid it at all 
costs in law making. They create compound words so that one word means only 
one thing. Where in English we talk of "hardship" and in French of imprtvision, 
words that would fail a Llewellyn test, they say Wegfalldesgeschcftsgrundlage, 
meaning that he very foundation of the agreement goes away, this because due to 
unforeseen events, one party would be bound to tender a performance excessively 
onerous or excessively cheap compared to what the parties reasonably expected at 
the time of contracting. When borrowing this German doctrine, the Italians coined 
the term eccessiva onerositc, which does not include the word contract but is 
precise enough and may pass Llewellyn's test." This incursion into German proves 
that in fabricating and using technical legal terms, we can do better. This favours 
more accurate communication among experts, at the cost of confusing lay people 
to whom laws are meant to apply:" while the French favoured plain language at 
least in the Civil Code,1 6 Germans made the choice of computer-like precision and 
mathematical complexity." 
Things are radically different in East-Asian cultures. In China, Confucius brought 
in a deep distrust of laws. "The true cohesion of a society is secured not through legal 
rules but through ritual observances".'" According to Confucius, a king leads by his 
moral power' 9 and words are of central importance. As Confucius explained: 
If the names are not correct, if they do not match realities, language has no 
object. If language is without an object, action becomes impossible - and 
therefore, all human affairs disintegrate and their management becomes 
pointless and impossible. Hence, the very first task of a true statesman is 
to rectify the names.2 0 
12 James Whitman, "Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for 
the Uniform Commercial Code" (1987) 97 Yale LI 156. 
13 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kdtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Trans. Tony Weir (Oxford: 
14 3 14 8 Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 1998) pp. - . 
14 See art.1467 of the Italian Civil Code. 
15 In the United States, the movement towards plain language legal writing started with David Mellinkoff, 
The Language of the Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963). It influenced federal egislation such 
as the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and the Plain Writing Act of 2010. See also, in a broader 
perspective, Karen A. Schriver, "Plain Language in the U.S. Gains Momentum: 1940-2015", (2017) 60:4 
IEEE Transactionson ProfessionalCommunication 343. 
16 Jean Leclair, "Le Code civil des Franqais de 1804: une transaction entre revolution et reaction" (2002) 
77 Revuejuridique Themis 1, 21 and Olivier Moreteau, "Codes as Strait-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis: 
The Experience of the French Civil Code" (1995) 20 North CarolinaJournalofInternationalLaw and 
CommercialRegulation 273, 279. 
14 4 14 5 17 Zweigert and Kdtz, An Introductionto ComparativeLaw (a 13) pp. - . 
18 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness, CollectedEssays (New York: New York Review of Books, 2013) 
p.322. See also TheAnalects of Confucius,Trans. and notes by SimonLeys (alias Pierre Ryckmans) (New 
York and London: Norton, 1997). 
3 2 3 19 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness, CollectedEssays (a 18) p. . 
20 Ibid. 
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What is it that we compare? Section II reflects on the words of the title of this 
article, showing how problematic they are. Section III addresses the language of 
the comparatists: what words do we use when describing and comparing legal 
systems? The whole article will show that words of comparative law, much like 
comparative law itself, are on the move. 
II. Comparing What? Words of the Title 
The words "comparative law" and their equivalent in other languages (droit 
compare, diritto comparato, Rechtsvergleichung) have been there for well over 
hundred years, and attracted international attention in 1900 with the Paris Congrds 
internationalde droitcompare, 21later to flourish after World War II22 with a focus 
on convergence, universalism and a trend towards harmonisation. 23 
Forefathers like Edouard Lambert, who was inspired by his master Raymond 
Saleilles, drew a distinction between "comparative history" (histoirecomparative) 
and "comparative legislation"(legislationcomparde), and interestingly, the French 
terms distinguish between "comparative" and "compared". They use "comparative" 
with history, a process, and "compared" with legislation, pointing to a body of legal 
rules, soon to be addressed as law (droitcompare). Both perspectives tend to merge 
nowadays in comparative legal history.24 
What is it that we compare and what does it mean to be comparative? This is 
asking the question of the corpus on the one hand and the process on the other. It 
is an invitation to reflect on the words "law" and "comparative", starting with the 
substantive and then discussing the adjective. 
A. The Corpus 
The reports presented in Paris in 1900 show that Lambert, Saleilles and other 
participants were aware of the need to extend the scope of comparative studies 
beyond legislation, 2 5 and to target doctrinal literature and court decisions, all 
elements later redefined as legal formants 2 6. They also characterised the comparative 
approach as a science, while acknowledging concrete applications when it came to 
21 Congres internationalde droitcompare 1900, Proces-verbauxdes seances et documents (Paris: LGDJ, 
1905). 
22 See, eg, HC Gutteridge, ComparativeLaw: An Introductionto the ComparativeMethod ofLegal Study 
andResearch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946). 
23 Vivian Grosswald Curran, ComparativeLaw, An Introduction (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002) 
pp.7-29. 
24 Olivier Moreteau, Aniceto Masferrer and Kjell A Modeer (eds.), ComparativeLegal History (London: 
Elgar, 2019). 
25 A Societe de legislation comparee had been founded in Paris in 1869, operating under that name. 
26 Rodolfo Sacco, "Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law" (1991) 39:1 American 
Journalof ComparativeLaw 1-34 continued in (1991) 39:2 American Journal of ComparativeLaw 
343-401. 
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improving the law or facilitating transnational activities, a chief motivation in the 
foundation of the Institut de droit compare Edouard Lambert in Lyon.27 It was also 
made clear that the corpus was to include unwritten law such as custom and usages: 
Lambert pushed his disciples to study usages and custom in the workplace and in 
international trade.28 
Addressing custom, however, the focus tends to be on those usages that are 
recognised and enforced by state authorities. Such usages tend to be regarded as 
customary law by both the civil law and the common law. In the 1980s, attempts 
were made to disconnect custom from state law, in the context of international trade. 
Rend David demonstrated that many transnational norms applied in the context of 
international business transactions find no support in state law and can be described 
as droitnon-tatique.29 This is an area of the law where professional organisations 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce and many other non-governmental 
trade organisations keep track of evolving usages and put them in written form, in 
publications that are regularly updated.3 0 The concept of "stateless law" (the idea 
that law can exist without the state as the primary source of creation, enforcement 
and legitimacy of law or that social norms without the sanction of state law may 
coexist with state law) has gained currency in recent literature,3' though "stateless 
law" may not be the best term to translate droit non-ttatique. The concept is fuzzy 
and unclear, defined as "a form of law in which the social context is as important 
as the text".32 Thus defined, it may include soft law and many other fuzzy things. 
These developments show that comparatists go beyond the written and unwritten 
norms to address social context, which is central to the development of custom. 
Legal pluralists such as Roderick Macdonald and Jacques Vanderlinden 
enlarge the scope of investigation and invite us to rethink the corpus ofcomparative 
studies. Vanderlinden identifies no less than four different uses of the word custom 
in legal discourse:33 
27 Edouard Lambert, L Institut de Droit Compare, son programme, ses mithodes d'enseignement (Lyon, 
Rey, 1921). 
28 Olivier Morteau, "Edouard Lambert et l'enseignement du droit comme science sociale et comparative" 
in David Deroussin (ed.), Le renouveau des sciences ociales etjuridiquessous la I Republique: La 
Facult de droitde Lyon (Paris: La m6moire du droit, 2007) pp. 193, 196-197; Lejuristefrangaisentre 
ethnocentrisme et mondialisation(Paris: Dalloz, 2014) pp.2 12-214. 
29 Rend David, Le droit du commerce international.Reflexions d'un comparatistesur le droit international 
privP (Paris: Economica, 1987). 
30 See for instance the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits publishedby the International 
Chamber of Commerce, known in their present version as UCP 600, globally referred to in letters of 
credits, a largely unregulated area of banking activity. 
31 See, for example, Helge Dedek and Shauna Van Praagh (eds.), Stateless Law: EvolvingBoundariesofa 
Discipline (Oxford: Routledge, 2015). For a useful review of this book, see (2017) 21 EdinburghLaw 
Review 315-317. 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 Jacques Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" in Mordteau et al., ComparativeLegalHistory (n.24) 
140ff 
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(1) The supposed original policies prevailing in Western European communities 
prior to the revival of Roman law or in overseas communities before 
colonialism. The word also enables [the observer] to escape a systematic 
anachronistic or analocalistic34 reference to "law". 
(2) A specific formal source of law (along with legislation, case law, legal 
science or legal acts) inherited from Rome by the self-styled 'jurists" of 
Western Europe and developed within particular legal systems from the 
thirteenth century onwards, also called "customary law" by legal historians. 
(3) So much of indigenous law of a colony as the colonial administration 
recognised, which are commonly referred to as "customary law". 
(4) The remnants of original pre-colonial policies [or practices] still existing 
in "colonial" communities, which continue to function under colonial rule 
and the post-independence "new" policies, all functioning as autonomous, 
possibly clandestine (and often considered by the state as illegal tension-
solving mechanisms in various social contexts). 35 
Vanderlinden first discusses custom (2) and (3), showing how custom, allegedly a 
form of spontaneous law that develops from the doings of the people, happened in 
a number of significant jurisdictions to be confiscated by emerging royal powers. 
In France, this was the drafting ofcustoms, starting under an order by King Charles 
VII in 1454.36 The moment judges got hold of a coutumier, the name given to a 
record of customs existing in a given region, they typically refused to consider any 
argument that the usage may have changed, and treated the coutumier as a written 
law.37 As Vanderlinden notes, "Originally and essentially connected to spontaneous 
life action and experience, custom is transformed in either a doctrinal or a statutory 
source of law, as it takes the written form".38 He shows that the same happened 
in England when the royal courts deprived the people of Kent of the custom of 
gavelkind, a system of tenure promoting equal division of land among the heirs of 
the landholder. As it conflicted with primogeniture, judges insisted that all customs 
of Kent be reduced into writing, then refusing to hear of any custom that was not 
34 The adjective comes from the noun analocalism, usedby Vanderlinden in order to designate the unjustified 
transfer of a notion applicable in one place to another where it is not applicable, Jacques Vanderlinden,
3 6 3 
Lespluralismesjuridiques(Brussels, Bruylant, 2013) p. . 
35 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source ofLaw" (n.33) p.143. 
36 Ordinance of Montil-Les-Tours, 15 April 1454, art.125. 
37 Jacques Vanderlinden, "La coutume dans le droit frangais des pays de coutumes aux XVP, XVIe et 
XVIIe si&cles" La coutume, Recuei/s de la Societe Jean Bodin, t. LII (Brussels: De Boeck Universite,
2 8 3 1990) p. . 
38 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source ofLaw" (n.33) p.146, also insisting on the fact that the drafting 
of custom was not made by representatives of the people butby "a King's official or ajudge or a group of 
persons made up of members of the nobility, the clergy, and the middle class" (ibid.). On the drafting 
of customs, see John Gilissen (ed.), La redactiondes coutumes dans le passe et le present (Brussels: 
Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, 1962). 
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recorded.3 9 Vanderlinden tries to make sense of what happened in France and in 
England, pointing to a trend towards the elaboration of a unitary system, issues 
that pertain to knowledge and also a sense of social and intellectual superiority of 
those administering the law, stigmatising "an impossible couple" between lawyers 
and custom.40 "Customary law" was to become a construct that, even in the opinion 
of the historians, had to be documented, though it is essentially oral and gestural. 
Whether one looks at custom (2) (post-Roman law) or (3) (colonial), we 
witness this Western assumption that customary law or custom must be mandatory 
to qualify as legal.4' We Westerners have locked the definition of the law: we are 
not willing to regard as law rules and processes that are not mandatory and not 
2enforced by state authorities. 4 
This is where we turn to Vanderlinden's custom (1) and (4). To understand this, 
we must move outside the model of the state's monopoly to define and implement 
the laws, which brings us to the realm of legal pluralism. The individual must be 
placed at the centre and considered as subjected to several networks of rules, some 
state-based (and properly legal as we define it) and others stateless, such as religion, 
professional groups, social or sport associations, criminal organisations and groups of 
all kinds. Not all these norms would qualify as law as we define it, but the life of the 
individual is conditioned by these networks ofnorms and often-conflicting policies. 4 3 
We know very little of pre-Revival of Roman law customs of Western Europe 
(custom (1) above), but Vanderlinden, whilst warning against the "doubly mortal 
sin" of anachronism and analocalism, shares his intuition that there may be 
similarities with custom (4), existing in Africa pre-colonisation and re-emerging 
after independence.4 4 Law in these societies can be defined, in Gabon as "ivanga", 
meaning "what man does"45 or "Diola" in Senegal, where the village chief says that 
what he enforces is "the ways of doing of the Diola".46 Where chiefs appear to have 
39 Ibid., noting that with few exceptions such as CK Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 7th ed., 1966), most authors do not discuss custom in the context ofEnglish law. 
40 Ibid., p.147. See also Jacques Vanderlinden, "Le juriste et la coutume, un couple impossible ? (bis) ou, 
A propos de Mdthode d'interprdtation et sources, contrepoint au depart d'une image frangaise de la loi 
et du juge" in Philippe Jestaz (ed.), Franqois Giny, mythe et rdalitis (Paris: Dalloz, 2000) p.5 5 and 
Jacques Vanderlinden, "Rdseaux, pyramide et pluralisme ou regards sur la rencontre de deux aspirants-
paradigmes de la science juridique" (2002) 49 Revue interdisciplinaired'Ptudesjuridiques11. 
41 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.150 notes the effort to make the custom more 
accessible by writing "if a man wishes to take a wife, he will ask the parents of the woman" rather than "the 
consent of the parents of the woman is required as an essential condition of the celebration of the marriage". 
42 This perspective is challenged in contemporary literature. See the essays gathered in Sean Patrick Donlan 
and Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (eds.), The ConceptsofLaw, Comparative,Jurisprudential, and Social 
Sciences Perspectives(Burlington: Ashgate, 2014). 
43 See Vanderlinden, Lespluralismesjuridiques(n.34). 
44 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source ofLaw" (n.33) pp.160-161. 
45 Etienne Le Roy, "Justice africaine et oralit6juridique" (1974) 36 Bulletin de lInstitutfrangaisdAfrique 
noire 559. 
46 Etienne Le Roy, L'esprit de la coutume et l'ideologiede la loi, La connaissancedu droit en Afrique 
(Brussels: Academie royale des sciences d'outre-mer, 1985) p.2 10 . 
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absolute power, one discovers that there is no chief without subjects and that the 
making of a chief is the result of a mysterious alchemy with countless variables. 
All of what would be regulated by institutions and rules in the West appears to be 
conditioned by "ways of doing" in other cultures.4 
Now, does it mean we have to regard all this as the law? Vanderlinden eventually 
resisted and now says that "law" should be used only where there is a state, if we 
want to avoid polysemy." However, that does not mean that custom (1) and (4) 
are to be left out of our comparative efforts. For the sake of language consistency, 
Vanderlinden suggests renaming custom (1) and (4) "do" because it reflects what 
is being done in a group, regardless of whether mandatory or not. Very often these 
are mechanisms aiming at re-establishing social harmony in the group, which may 
fully ignore Western ideas of guilt or culpa, as is the case with the Inuit.4 9 
We must be able, when we look at these legal systems, to go beyond what we 
call law, whether in the form of legislation or custom. Not that we must describe 
"non-legal" mechanisms as "law" for very often they are not. But because these 
mechanisms are used where in the Western world we resort to the law, they must 
be taken into account as elements of the corpus and therefore be included in the 
comparative process. They are more than context o be aware of when looking 
at the corpus of what constitutes law: they are processes filling the tasks that we 
typically assign to the law, and therefore belong to the corpus. 
For example, can we look at the law of China, ignoring the multitude of "non-
legal" mechanisms that are cultural and political, and focus only on what resembles 
what we are doing in the West? 0 Doing this may lead to a misconception in our 
understanding of how China works, with the centrality of the Party controlling 
judicial decisions just as much as it does politics and every aspect of social and 
economic life. Obviously, the Chinese culture, as well as the influence of the Party, 
must be taken into account as elements of the corpus.5 
The reader will not find here a new definition of the word "law" but may 
come to realise that this word, used in the singular in the term "comparative law", 
may be too narrow to cover the larger scope of what we need to investigate in 
our comparative activity, particularly when we consider non-Western societies. 
47 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source ofLaw" (n.33) p.163. 
48 Ibid., p.164. 
This is where the distinction between law and norm and the restriction of the former to state-
controlled norm seems to me essential for the sake of clarity. Hence, considering legal and 
normative pluralisms and assuming the state allows another law than its own to operate within its 
jurisdiction, the first one (legal pluralism) is possibly a limited and narrowly defined variant of 
the very wide - if not limitless - second one (normative pluralism), which in turn, can manifest 
itself in single shared facts. 
49 Ibid., 159. 
50 For a pluralistic approach of Chinese law, see Werner Menski, ComparativeLaw in a Global Context, The 
4 9 3 59 3 Legal Systems ofAsia andAfrica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2006) pp. - . 
51 Ibid., pp.584-593. 
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We need to take into account "non-legal" mechanisms and policies that play the 
role of law when considering these societies, and this with a pluralistic attitude. 
The major breakthrough of Macdonald's critical pluralism and Vanderlinden's 
radical pluralism is a shift of paradigm, just like turning the pyramid of norms on 
its head,5 2 looking at things from the perspective of the individual rather than the 
state: pluralists do not simply look into what the abstract rule or norm is but may 
question the way it is perceived and experienced by a variety of individuals or 
social groups. It is like accepting to look into the fact that, as would be the case in 
the United States, laws banning certain substances (e.g. marijuana), though colour 
blind on paper, are strictly or harshly applied to people with a dark skin while being 
largely overlooked in the case of others. All social mechanisms resorted to in order 
to solve disputes and re-establish social harmony may not qualify as "law" in the 
traditional sense but belong to the corpus of comparative legal studies. 
This extends the scope of legal formants identified by Rodolfo Sacco,53 useful 
as those may be, in revising our approach to legal sources. Of course, traditional 
legal formants, be they legislation, judicial decisions, doctrine or practice, must 
be taken into account, but we must consider the "do's" when considering non-
Western cultures. We must also consider the "do's" when studying Western legal 
systems because of the constantly evolving social mix and the importance of 
immigration, which has an undeniable impact on the way laws are administered in 
the postcolonial West. 4 
We then end up comparing what at first sight does not look comparable, not 
only oranges with oranges but apples with oranges. 
Regarding the corpus, the words "comparative law" may be a misnomer for at 
least two sets of reasons. First, the word "law" appears in the singular in a sort of 
absolute way, as if law was to be compared to itself. At the very least, we should use 
a plural (comparative laws), like in Comparerles droits" or Premierspas dans la 
comparaisondes droits.56 Second, the word "law" does not include the whole corpus 
of what is meant to be compared, at least if it is understood stricto sensu. Either 
we accept to refer to "laws" lato sensu, in which case we will have "comparative 
laws", or we must substitute a broader term to law, to make it clear that the corpus 
includes non-legal (and sometimes illegal) social norms and mechanisms. We may 
want to talk about comparative norms, but this is too restrictive as "do's" go beyond 
the scope of nonnativity. 
52 Jacques Vanderlinden, "Reseaux, pyramide et pluralisme ou regards sur la rencontre de deux aspirants-
paradigmes de la science juridique" (n.40). 
53 Sacco, "Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law" (n.26). 
54 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism:Examining the PoliticsofRecognition(Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994). 
55 Jacques Vanderlinden, Comparerles droits (Brussels: Story Scientia, 1995). 
56 Olivier Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" in Jean-Claude Gemar and Nicholas 
Kasirer (eds.), Jurilinguistique: entre langues et droits; Jurilinguistics:Between Law and Language 
(Montreal: Bruylant and Themis, 2005) p.407. 
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From the point of view of the corpus, one may advocate for "comparative 
laws" with an invitation to embrace the polysemy of the word: would it make us 
sinners like our biblical ancestors biting into the fruit of the tree of knowledge? 
It does not make us enemies of science, because we go beyond that one tree and 
embrace reality with pluralistic eyes. Regarding knowledge, the sin may be to feast 
off one unique source or observe from one unique perspective." 
The change of adding one letter, the mark of the plural, is minimal, and yet 
potentially huge. Traditionalists may be somehow reassured, and critical or radical 
pluralists may agree, as they after all stick to the term "legal" pluralism though 
inviting to embrace a much broader scope of investigation. We may also accept 
"legal comparatism" as a synonym to "comparative laws". 
Before making a final proposal, we need to embrace the word "comparative", 
which is before all a process. 
B. The Process 
Much has been written on the comparative method as applied to the study of the 
law," recently to acknowledge the centrality of comparative legal history to legal 
science.5 9 In the humanities and social sciences, and also in life sciences, any 
phenomenon we approach needs to be observed in the perspective of its origins and 
evolution, and the human mind is quick to draw comparisons with other phenomena 
of a similar kind. Comparison is part of the cognitive process.60 
Writing about the first steps in comparative law, in an attempt to educate and 
not discourage the beginner, I wrote: 
One is prompt at saying that comparison is a complex and sophisticated 
activity best to be left to the trained specialist. Yet, from early childhood, at 
the age ofthe first steps, it appears to be the first human intellectual activity. 
It is part of the cognitive process and it develops with the acquisition of 
57 Olivier Mordteau, "Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring the Broth, 
Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding Contamination" (2011) 4 Journal of Civil Law 
Studies 516, 536-538. 
58 See for instance Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed.), Methods of Comparative Law (Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012) and Esin Orici, "Methodology of Comparative Law" in Jan M. 
4 4 2 
Smits (ed.), ElgarEncyclopediaof ComparativeLaw (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2006) p. . 
59 Aniceto Masferrer, Kjell A Modder and Olivier Mordteau, "The Emergence of Comparative Legal 
History" in Mordteau et al., ComparativeLegal History (n.24) pp.1, 6-13. The volume contains essays 
by Adolfo Giuliani, Sean Patrick Donlan, Dag Michalsen and Matthew Dyson discussing theory and 
methods. 
60 As Vivian Curran writes, "[t]he cognitive sciences suggest hat each individual's cognition depends on 
comparison, because human understanding is a function of relating one entity or domain to another": 
Vivian Grosswald Curran, "Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law" 
(1998) 46 American Journalof Comparative Law 43, 47, citing George Lakoff, Women, Fire and 
DangerousThings: What CategoriesReveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987). 
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language. With games of shapes and colors, the child is trained to typology. 
When noticing that the everyday rules of conduct are more lenient at the 
grand-parents' home than at home and later on at school, the child engages 
in some form of legal comparatism.6 
Law students use comparison from their first day in law school, when they 
distinguish public law from private law, compare civil and criminal procedure 
and limitation periods in tort and contract, etc.62 In most jurisdictions, they focus 
on just one legal system, but spontaneously, during a study abroad experience or 
when hearing of a foreign legal system, they engage in some more or less elaborate 
comparative process. 
Adults tired of children comparing all the time say that one does not compare 
apples with oranges, as if only two things that are alike can be compared. Yet, why 
not comparing a pencil with a typewriter and a computer? The moment we look 
at them in the light of a function, like producing a text, the comparison of very 
3different things becomes possible. 6 
The comparative process is intimately connected to legal science, addressing 
law in its broadest sense as an object of study and knowledge. In this sense, it is 
fair to use the word law in the singular, like one does when discussing comparative 
anatomy, comparative literature and comparative religion. As Vivian Curran wrote: 
"In its essence, comparative legal analysis is just legal analysis, since comparison 
is not unique to the field of comparative legal analysis, since, rather, all analysis, 
legal and other, is comparative at heart".64 
The current trend of comparative legal studies is to embrace diversity,65 though 
rarely erring towards the extreme and unacceptable view that cultural diversity is an 
obstacle to comparison. 6 6 Yet, one should not lose sight of the universal dimension 
of human experience, reflected in philosophy and sometimes in anthropology: 
though it must not be neglected, cultural diversity may not be of central importance 
in making sense of the human experience. Rend Girard has demonstrated that all 
desire is mimetic (meaning that our desires are borrowed from other people). 67 
61 Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" (a56) p.410. 
62 See Xavier Thunis, "L'empire de la comparaison" in Frangois van der Menssbrugghe (ed.), L'utilisation 
de la mithode comparativeen droiteuropden (Namur: Presses universitaires de Namur, 2003) p. 5 . 
63 This defeats the idea of the presumptio similitudinis, which causes the functional method to be criticised 
in recent literature. See Ralf Michaels, "The Functional Method of Comparative Law" in Mathias 
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The OxfordHandbook ofComparativeLaw (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) pp.339, 369-372. 
64 Vivian Grosswald Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" in Reimann and Zimmermann (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook ofComparativeLaw (n.63) pp.675, 699. 
65 See for instance volumes published in the Juris Diversitas Book Series, Ashgate and Routledge. 
66 Pierre Legrand, Negative ComparativeLaw (London: Taylor & Francis, 2018). 
67 Rene Girard, Mensonge romantiqueet veritPRomanesque (Paris: Grasset, 1961); Deceit, Desire andthe 
Novel (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965); La violence et le sacrP (Paris: Grasset, 1972); iolence and 
the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Des choses cachies depuis lafondation 
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Mimetic desire is the source of mimetic rivalry, the source of all human conflicts 
leading to spurges of violence. Identifying a scapegoat and murdering it is the 
way to bring about desirable peace. A Rend Girard-inspired or mimetic-driven 
comparative analysis of the diverse legal systems remains to be written, analysing 
laws and policies as tools for channelling violence and restoring social harmony. 
At least from an anthropological and philosophical viewpoint, it is likely to reveal 
much unity amongst cultural diversity, as also does the concept of natural law. 
With these multiple layers, it makes it all the more challenging to discuss the 
language of the comparatists. 
III. In What Language? Words of the Comparatists 
We comparatists not only face the need of understanding foreign languages and 
cultures but also constantly struggle with the choice of words, whether we write 
or speak in our native language or in a foreign language. We face the lexicon of 
at least two distinct systems depending on how many systems we embrace in our 
work. While some scholars do not hesitate to say that the comparative process is 
translation,68 others insist on the need to resort to a neutral language.69 
The conversation is confusing if we discuss the language of comparison in 
general. We need to identify what we are doing step by step, remembering that 
comparative law is a broad term encompassing a variety of tasks. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will break them down in accordance with a commonplace trilogy: 
comparative law aims at understanding the law of the other (task 1), comparative 
law aims at bridging differences between legal systems and helps identify or develop 
a uniform or harmonised law where needed (task 2) and comparative law favours 
a better understanding of one's own legal system, sometimes trying to improve 
it by importing foreign elements or making sense of those foreign elements that 
influence it (task 3). This third task is largely reflexive and derives from the other 
two. Though it generates its own words, it will be left out of the scope ofthis paper. 
Task 1 is diversity driven, while task 2 is unity driven. Either or both can be 
conducted with a practical purpose in mind or for the mere sake of knowledge. 
I need to know the law of the other party when doing business with or operating 
in the other's foreign environment, but I may want to know the law of another 
country out of curiosity, for the sake of knowledge. Likewise, regarding task 2, 
the drive to unification and harmonisation may be for a practical purpose. But the 
comparatist may also wish to have a broader understanding of existing models, say, 
regarding land control, market transactions, family or business organisations and 
du monde (Paris: Grasset, 1978) and Things Hidden Since the Foundationofthe World (London: Athlone 
Press, 1987). 
68 Curran, Comparative Law, An Introduction (n.23) pp.31-45 and Curran, "Comparative Law and 
Language" (n.64). 
4 2 6 4 2 8 69 Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" (a56) pp. - . 
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control of governmental authorities, dealing with violent crime, simply for the sake 
of knowledge. Whether our motivations are practice or knowledge driven is not 
always clear, and it does not really matter. Both tend to mingle both in our teaching 
and academic writing. Sacco rightly complains that comparatists are put to the test 
of proving the usefulness of their activity, as if the pursuit of knowledge itself was 
not a legitimate purpose.70 
The point is that the language we need, the words we use, is not the same 
whether we analyse, describe or teach a foreign legal system (task 1) or engage 
in system building (task 2, which must be preceded by task 1).71 While the first 
activity has much to do with translation, the second one is hard to achieve without 
some kind of metalanguage. 
A. Analysing the Law of the Other: Comparative Law 
as Translation 
The first step in a comparative study is the description of the law of the other. 
It is easy when the systems we compare share the same origins and are expressed 
in one language, like the civil codes of Belgium and France, though the similarity 
of interpretation is never guaranteed. 72 However, the law of the other is usually 
expressed in a foreign language. Vivian Curran opens her study of comparative law 
and language with the following words: 
At the simplest level of observation, language issues arise in connection 
with comparative law because people in different countries speak in 
different languages, producing legal texts in foreign languages that become 
3the target of comparative legal studies. 7 
Comparatists must be multilingual,74 and "the range of legal cultures they can study 
by the foreign languages they know" is necessarily limited. 75 These limits also 
apply to the audience of comparative work. As Vivian Curran says: 
70 Rodolfo Sacco, La comparaisonjuridique au service de la connaissancedu droit (Paris: Economica, 
1991) pp.5-8. In Zweigert and Kdtz, An Introductionto ComparativeLaw (n.13) p.15, the authors do not 
shy at asserting that "the primary aim of comparative law is knowledge". 
71 InMoreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaisondes droits" (n.56) pp.425-428, I first discuss the language 
of the foreign system, and then the need of a neutral language of reference for the sake of comparison 
72 Contrast for instance the interpretation of art. 1384, para.1 in France and inBelgium. See Olivier Moreteau, 
"Basic Questions of Tort Law from a French Perspective" in Helmut Koziol (ed.), Basic Questionsof Tort 
Lawfrom a ComparativePerspective(Vienna: Jan Sramek Verlag, 2015) pp.3, 67-69. 
73 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.676. 
74 On hyperpolyglots or language superlearners, see Michael Erard, Babel No More: The Searchfor the 
World s Most ExtraordinaryLanguageLearners(New York: Free Press, 2012). 
75 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.678. 
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if foreign language knowledge is crucial, then even a polyglot comparative 
law scholar may not be able to communicate successfully to students 
who are unable to read foreign texts except in translation, thus reducing 
comparative law's educational potential .76 
The best approach is for the comparatist to discover the foreign system by immersion 
and then expose it by translation, a process also familiar to comparative-literature 
and comparative-religion scholars. 
(i) Discovering Othemess by Immersion 
The best way to study a foreign legal system is not only to read its source 
documents in the original language but also to visit the foreign jurisdiction and 
experience its culture, legal and at large, by way of immersion, which may also 
include field experience and practice. "The immersion approach in comparative 
legal analysis suggests the importance of trying to understand foreign legal cultures 
in an untranslated form; i.e., through the prisms that shape perceptions in the target 
legal culture".77 Vivian Curran explains that "[t]his implies both an expansion and 
alteration of the comparatist's prisms", 78 an experience that is rarely described in 
legal literature79 but is sometimes shared by comparatists in the form of anecdotes 
in the classroom, during public lectures or at the dinner table. 
As Grossfeld writes: "Different languages represent different world-views. 
When we learn another language we unconsciously adopt its speakers' world 
of thought: 'Language thinks in us"'. 80 For this reason, working from translated 
texts is less useful because translation is already the result of comparative legal 
analysis; perceptions will be "contaminated" by the work of the translator. The 
problem is not circular but linear, and it is only a risk, not a necessity: "Whereas 
translation precedes comparative legal analysis, legal translation 'merely' risks 
2being inadequate without prior comparative legal analysis". 8 
76 Ibid. 
77 Curran, "Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law" (n.60) 57. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere ... or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical 
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.157 (discussing the problem of succession in 
the chiefdomwiththe Zande chief Ukwatutu); see also Rene David, Les avatarsd'un comparatiste(Paris: 
Economica, 1982). 
80 Grossfeld, Strength and Weakness of ComparativeLaw (a2) p.96, citing Emil Wezel, Sprache und Geist 
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1935) p.iv and referring to the philosophy of language of Gottfried von Herder 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt: "For Humboldt language is the formative organ of thought. It is not just a 
device for representing the truth, but 'much more, of discovering truth hitherto unrecognised"' (ibid.). 
81 CJW Baaij, "Translation and the 'Contamination' of Comparative Legal Research" in Simone Glanert 
(ed.), ComparativeLaw - EngagingTranslation(Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2014) p. 1 04 . 
82 Ibid., p.106, emphasis in the original. Hence, the need for the linguist to be trained in comparative law 
before engaging into legal translation: see Guadalupe Soriano-Barabino, Comparative Law for Legal 
Translators(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016). 
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However, as much as it is important to absorb the original culture by its own 
prisms and channels: 
comparatists need to retain their stance as outsiders even as they acquire 
insight into the insiders' view. Otherwise they will fail to perceive with 
sufficient acuity those fundamental, powerful aspects oftarget legal cultures 
which are so entrenched as to be unarticulated and even unconscious.83 
The comparatist should be what French philosopher Michel Serres calls a Ters-
Instruit, an educated outsider, a TroubadourofKnowledge as translators have it." 
As much as it is necessary to master the language of the other, we need 
to assess the difference between what is spoken and what is not." The general 
tendency in Western cultures is to speak out and address matters explicitly. Yet 
there are variations. In the traditional close-knit English society, understatements 
are commonplace, and the phrase "I would not do it that way" expresses strong 
reprobation. By comparison, Americans are fond of superlative expression and 
exaggeration, and use explicit language, probably because the population is not 
homogenous and does not share a centuries-old common code, like the English or 
the French. In Japan, the proportion of the spoken to the unspoken is allegedly of 1 
to 9: "The general view is that the less verbal one's position is, the more polite and 
rich it is in implications".86 
Rodolfo Sacco has characterised the implicit models and notions that can be 
invisible or hidden formants as "cryptotypes"," and shows their importance in the 
understanding oflaws, legal language and legal cultures, as markers of the mentality 
of a legal system. He explains that they become visible through the comparison 
with another system where the same notions are explicit. The synecdoche orpars 
pro toto is another example." Bernhard Grossfeld has these insightful words: 
83 Curran, "Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law" (n.60) 57-58, citing 
George Steiner, OnDifficulty andOther Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) p.26, who wrote 
that "learning [is] the suspension of reflex". 
84 Michel Serres, Le Tiers-Instruit,Gallimard 1992, transl. Sheila Faria Glaser with William Paulson as The 
Troubadour ofKnowledge (Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press, 1997). 
85 Grossfeld, Strength and Weakness of ComparativeLaw (n.2) p.97. 
86 Sayo Yotsukura, "Ethnolinguistic Introduction to Japanese Literature" in William C McCormack and 
Stephen A Wurm (eds.), Language and Thought, Anthropological Issues (The Hague: Mouton, 1977) 
pp.261, 263. Yosiyuki Noda, Introduction to JapaneseLaw (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976) 
pp.9-13, with a description of the Japanese language, summarised by Grossfeld, Strength and Weakness 
of ComparativeLaw (a2) p.100, in the following terms: "Japanese is better adapted to the expression 
of feeling than to logical argument; as a language of poetry rather than scholarship, it is not good at 
expressing logical relations". 
87 The word points to what is hidden. Sacco, La comparaisonjuridiqueau service de la connaissancedu 
droit (n.70) pp.105-108. 
88 Pier Giuseppe Monateri, "Regles et technique de la definition dans le droit des obligations et des contrats 
en France et en Allemagne : la synecdoque frangaise" (1984) Revue internationalede droitcompare 7. 
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rules of conduct generally are only in part made known through language; 
what is most important often remains "between the lines", "between one 
word and another". The silent space between words is of different breadth 
in different cultures. Words "swim" on an "ocean" of silence; they relate 
to a common, silent background.89 
Even in legal systems that favour explicit language, such as the United States, there 
appear some untranslatable words which, while ubiquitous, express the American 
legal mind. It takes prolonged immersion in the United States to get a fair perception 
of concepts such as "law", "policy", "due process", "fairness", "reasonableness", 
0"deference", and "discretion". 9 Conversely, some civil law concepts challenge 
common law-trained scholars. 9' Think for instance of the distinction between 
"juridical acts" and 'juridical facts". 
As much as immersion matters,92 the comparatist must not neglect external 
literature on the target legal system (ie, books or articles written by third-country 
scholars), especially when written by reputable comparatists. Doing so implies a 
judgment call as to whether the author has experienced immersion and regarding 
the time and context of the publication. 
Jaakko Husa insists that "the question concerning the comprehension of 
substance of law is more fundamental than purely technical inguistic orientation".93 
This by no means undermines the importance of language, legal and general. The 
comparatist is a passeur, a go-between vested with the duty of communicating 
the words of otherness to the home audience, which in essence is an exercise in 
translation. 
(ii) Communicating Otherness by Translation 
After or during the immersion in the foreign legal system, the comparatist is called 
upon to share the knowledge ofthe foreign legal system with students, scholars and 
the "real" world as one sometimes describes practice in academic circles. Whether 
89 Bernhard Grossfeld, Kernfragen der Rechtsvergleichung, Mohr 1996, translated by Vivian Curran, 
ComparativeLaw, An Introduction(n.23) p.34. 
90 George P Fletcher and Steve Sheppard, American Law in a Global Context, The Basics (New York: 
5 4 7 4 Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. - ("The Language of Law") and George P Fletcher, "Fair and 
Reasonable. A Linguistic Glimpse into the American Legal Mind" in Rodolfo Sacco and Luca Castellani 
(eds.), Les Multiples langues du droiteuropeenuniforme (Turin: L'Harmattan Italia, 1999) p.57. 
91 Shawn Marie Boyne, "Translating Civil Law 'Objectivity' with an Adversarial Brain: An Ethnographic 
Perspective" in Glanert (ed.), ComparativeLaw -Engaging Translation(a81) p.123. 
92 This part of the effort is rarely rewarded in terms of academic recognition (see Olivier Moreteau, "Ne 
tirez pas sur le comparatiste" (2005) Rec Dalloz 452), but the return on investment is usually immense 
regarding personal and scholarly enrichment. 
93 Jaakko Husa, "Understanding Legal Languages: Linguistic Concerns of the Comparative Lawyer" in 
CJW. Baaij (ed.), The Role ofLegal Translationin LegalHarmonization (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 
2012) pp.161, 178. In Husa, A New Introductionto ComparativeLaw (n.3) p.195, he writes: "Must the 
comparatist be a linguistic genius?" The answer is: "no", which will sound as good news for many a 
reader 
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or not actual translation is needed, this is an exercise in communication that implies 
translation or is very similar to translation. Familiarity with the experience of 
teaching English and American law to a French audience in English or in French, 
and teaching French law or civil law systems to an Anglo-American audience in 
English or at times in French, helps understand that these are exercises in cross-
border communication, passing both systemic legal borders and linguistic borders.94 
Legal translation is indeed different from other types of specialised translations.95 
Vivian Curran understands that "the decoding process, whether of foreign 
language or law, is a process of translation. Understanding translation's mechanisms 
thus illuminates the process of comparative law. Translation is both de-coding and 
re-coding, identifying and constructing meaning".96 
The facts that based on some neuroscience breakthrough, some linguists and 
philosophers of languages can now demonstrate that the human brain is wired for 
the acquisition of language and that all the languages of the world are governed by 
a limited set of structures, at the first sight, seem to contradict the above analysis.97 
Yet, they do not dissipate the mysteries of communication, which always lies 
beyond language.98 As Curran has it: 
The polyglot knows that much alterity is not apparent. The polyglot legal 
comparatist knows that legal orders reside as much beneath and aside from 
words as they do in the words that purport to embody them.99 
Translation is an exercise in communication and construction of meaning. The 
word translation literally means the process of moving something from one place 
94 Olivier Moreteau, "Les frontieres de la langue et du droit" in Rodolfo Sacco (ed.), The New Ambitions of 
LegalScience: LegalAnthropologyand Legal Traductology(n.4) p.63 and "Les frontieres de la langue et 
du droit: vers une methodologie de la traductionjuridique" (2009) Revue internationalede droitcompare 
695. 
95 Simone Glanert, "Translation Matters" in Glanert ComparativeLaw - EngagingTranslation(n.81) p.1. 
See also Jan Engberg, "Comparative Law for Translation: The Key to Successful Mediation between 
Legal Systems" in Anabel Borja Albi and Fernando Prieto Ramos (eds.), Legal Translationin Context, 
ProfessionalIssues and Prospects (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013) p.9, citing Michael Harvey, "What's so 
Special about Legal Translation?" (2002) Meta 47, 179-182, who points to four aspects: "(1) legal 
discourse gives rise to legal effects, (2) law is a system-bound discipline, (3) requirements on fidelity 
are higher than in other areas, and (4) legal texts are characterized by ambiguity and interpretation". See 
more generally, Le Cheng, King Kui Sin and Anne Wagner, The Ashgate Handbook ofLegal Translation 
(Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2014). 
96 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.679. 
97 Noam Chomsky, On Nature and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Language 
andMind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2006) and Steven Pinker, The Language 
Instinct, How the Mind CreatesLanguage (New York: William Morrow, 1994). 
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to another, acknowledging the existence of some space between these two places, a 
space in-between that must be visited by the translator 00 
Walter Benjamin says that the task ofthe translator is not that ofa communicator 
but of a craftsman contributing towards the achievement of the text by some sort of 
alchemy.'0 ' The translator's task aims at expressing the most intimate connection 
between languages, to identify a core that resists translation. Benjamin used 
the metaphor of a broken vessel, the original language providing incomplete 
fragments, some missing ones to be brought by the other language. The vessel 
will only near perfection once it is translated.10 2 Benjamin's metaphor shows the 
proximity of translation and interpretation, 03 both in a linguistic and an artistic 
sense. The cellist interpreting a Bach score must decipher silences between the 
signs.' 4 The comparatist-translator is also an interpreter and may be, occasionally, 
an artist. Jean-Claude Gemar demonstrates how one can catch the "spirit" of the 
law when co-drafting the text in several languages rather than translating. He 
proves Benjamin's point in showing how co-drafting produces a three-dimensional, 
unbroken vessel. 0 5 
When teaching English law in English to French students, I nonetheless 
have to translate, to equip them with the common law English terminology and 
the ability to express it in French. 06 Meeting the untranslatables, I tell them 
to keep the word in English and provide neologisms or periphrases as tools of 
communication. I recommend against translating terms such as "trusts", "Court 
of Appeal", "Master of the Rolls" and "frustration" of contract, but tell them 
that there is no problem with using Chambre des lords when talking about the 
House of Lords, replaced by a Supreme Court in 2009. Why? Because this is a 
literal translation, a decal, devoid of risk of confusion with a French institution, a 
danger that existed when translating "Court of Appeal". Overall, when teaching 
a foreign law, it may be a good idea to use source-based translation, a translation 
100 Anne Wagner, "A Space in-Between-Legal TranslationAs a 'Third Space"' (2016) 9 JournalofCivil 
Law Studies 167. 
101 WalterBenjamin, "The Task of the Translator" Selected Writings(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2 5 3 Vol.1 (1913-1926), 1996) p. . 
102 Ibid., p.260. 
103 Jean-Jacques Sueur (ed.), Interpreteret traduire (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007) with an essay by Frangois 
Ost, "Les detours de Babel" 13; see also Frangois Ost, Traduire.Defense et illustrationdu multilinguisme 
(Paris: Fayard, 2009). 
104 Alain Levasseur uses the verb decipher in the context of code interpretation: Alain A Levasseur, 
Decipheringa Civil Code, Sources ofLaw andMethods ofInterpretation(Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 2015). 
105 Jean-Claude Gemar, "Catching the Spirit of the Law: From Translation to Co-drafting" in Glanert (ed.), 
ComparativeLaw -Engaging Translation(n.81) p.6 7 . 
106 Husa, A New Introductionto ComparativeLaw (a3) p.195 insists on: 
the need to resort to material in the original language or at least in key issues to examine the 
contents of the foreign law (also) directly in the original language. When the aim is to reach the 
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as close as possible to the original. One may do the same in writing, as I did in 
Droitanglaisdes affaires.10 7 
A source-based approach is recommended when translating legislation, 08 
whereas a target-based approach is acceptable when translating doctrinal texts.'09 
Nicholas Kasirer invites us to use Geny's method of interpretation (librerecherche 
scientifique) as a translation method,"o a suitable approach when translating 
doctrine."' 
Our central point here is to convey what we learn about the foreign system to our 
home audience, and this is a place where we have to transcend the untranslatable, 
make it clear and complete, making Benjamin's broken vessel fully visible in three 
dimensions.11 2 This act of translation-communication-interpretation pushes the 
comparatist to get an even better understanding of the foreign system than during 
the immersion experience." Questions by students and comments on our papers 
force us to go beyond and fill silences with words and sounds, bringing additional 
depth and dimension. Teaching a foreign system or exposing it in books and articles 
is not meant to be literal translation of the foreign literature and language, as useful 
as this may be in some contexts,"' but a creative activity transcending what we 
observe, making it more complete than its description in the original literature 
and yet re-presenting it in a fully authentic way. The "spirit" of the law breathes 
in this in-between language or third space identified by Anne Wagner and Walter 
Benjamin."1 5 
The comparatist like the translator or the interpreter must be selfless, offering a 
"creation ofthe second degree" as explains Simon Leys with a musical comparison: 
Glenn Gould and Sviatoslav Richter are no less artists for not having 
themselves composed The Well-Tempered Clavier. Great interpreters 
efface themselves the better to serve their models; but the more successful 
they are at this task, the more deeply their individual temperament and 
sensitivities are being revealed in their interpretations. Every touch from a 
107 Olivier Morteau, Droit anglaisdes affaires (Paris: Dalloz, 2000). 
108 See the translation of the Louisiana Civil Code from English to French: Olivier Mordteau, Le Code civil 
de Louisiane, edition bilingue (Paris: Socidt6 de 16gislation compare, 2017) and "The Louisiana Civil 
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109 On the distinction of source-based and target-based translation, see Jean-Rend Ladmiral, Sourcier ou 
cibliste, Les profondeursde la traduction (Paris: Les belles lettres, 2014). 
110 Nicholas Kasirer, "Frangois Gdny's libre recherche scientifique As a Guide for Legal Translation" 
(2001) 61 LouisianaLaw Review 61, 331. 
111 Olivier Mordteau, "La traduction de l'euvre de Franqois Gdny: m6thode de traduction et sources 
doctrinales" in Olivier Cachard, Francois-Xavier Licari and Franqois Lormant (eds.), La pensee de 
FrancoisGeny (Paris: Dalloz, 2013) p.6 9 . 
112 Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator" (n.101) p.260. 
113 See the description of the immersion experience in the sub-paragraph above. 
114 In Mordteau, "La traduction de l'euvre de Frangois Gdny: m6thode de traduction et sources doctrinales" 
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great pianist, every stroke from a great calligrapher, becomes a mirror of 
the interpreter's mind.116 
When building systems however, the comparatist has a chance to move from the 
role of translator-interpreter to that of architect or composer. 
B. Building Systems: the Need for a Neutral Language 
Before addressing neutral words, a caveat is needed. Are the words we use ever 
neutral? The comparatist is a "rooted cosmopolitan"" 7 with large sometimes 
worldwide views, but a national or local system of reference, all too often located 
in the West. We are conditioned by the language and culture we evolve in,"8 a 
leitmotiv in this paper. Even when gifted with a broad mind, we have a natural 
tendency to favour words reflecting our time, culture and tradition. 
When comparing different legal systems from an identified and external point of 
view (tertium comparationis),we should use a neutral language or a metalanguage. 
In comparative anatomy, who would compare "cat legs" with "human legs" or 
"dog paws" with "human paws"? If looking at things with a scientific eye, you do 
not choose between human perspective and animal perspective but use a neutral 
language of "upper" and "lower limbs", understanding that upper means closer 
to the head." But here again, this arrangement reflects Western structuralist 
perceptions. Asian and African cultures may propose more fluid perceptions or 
representations of the human and animal body. 
Much has been done in the realm of private and public international law to 
develop a common language to facilitate the response to identified needs, sometimes 
with the help ofcomparatists, though this language is not necessarily neutral. Much 
is to be done in the speculative realm of theoretical knowledge to develop a neutral 
language. We will briefly explore the common language in the empire ofusefulness 
before speculating on a neutral language in a kingdom of uselessness. 
(i) Common Words of Usefulness: International Law and Practice 
Public international law was not built out of thin air but using building blocks 
of the civil law and common law traditions. The fact that this area of the law is 
developed in a limited number of languages favours the emergence of a common 
language of international law that more easily translates into other languages than 
will ever be the case in the realm of private law. The common language of public 
116 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness, CollectedEssays (n.18) pp.310-3 11. 
117 Bruce Ackerman, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism" (1994) 104 Ethics 516. 
118 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
50 p. . 
119 Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" (n.56) p.426. 
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international law directly derives from the law of Western nations. 20 It reflects the 
experience of the colonising powers rather than the colonised people and cannot 
be described as neutral terminology. The words of international human rights also 
reflect Western values like fair trial' 21or respect for private life.1 22 Likewise, the 
World Trade Organization is also developing a language of international trade law, 
predominantly expressed in English but translatable in other languages, based on 
the experience of developed countries of the West. 
Private international law develops in a more decentralised manner, as is 
particularly the case with the law of international business transactions. One notes 
the leadership of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. The 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has largely 
contributed to the promotion of a common language of contract law expressed in 
the six official languages of the Convention.1 23 A strong common law influence is 
noted with notions such as "fundamental breach" (art.25), "anticipatory breach" 
(arts.71-73) or "fitness" (art.35). "Remedies" (arts.45-52 and 61-65) is clearly 
a common law word, which has been promoted so as to become a neutral term 
usable in comparative law.1 24 Others are more neutral such as "conformity of the 
goods" (arts.35-44),"avoidance" (arts.49 and 64) or "exemption" (art.79), though 
the French force majeure is elsewhere a standard. The development of widely 
available soft-law instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, published in 1994 and updated in 2016, or the Principles of 
European Contract Law, also known as PECL or Lando Principles, contribute to the 
fine-tuning of the language of international business transactions. For instance, in 
the UNIDROIT Principles, "avoidance" is used in the context of contract validity 
where there would be nullity (civil law) or a void or voidable contract (common 
law), the word "termination" being used in the context of non-performance (rather 
than breach in the CISG). 
The plurality of sources favours the improvement of this terminology while 
bringing some diversity. One notes that many distinguished comparatists contribute 
to the drafting and updating of these instruments, thereby manufacturing convenient 
terms in contract-related matters. These always derive from the civil law and 
common law traditions and therefore from Western experience. Largely for practical 
reasons, which happen to coincide with the hegemony of some nations, English has 
120 See Hersch Lauterpacht, PrivateLaw Sources andAnalogiesofInternationalLaw (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1927) p.10 4 . 
121 European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms), art.6. 
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123 Lisa M Ryan, "The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent 
Interpretations" (1995) 54 Tulane JournalofInternationaland ComparativeLaw 99. 
124 Olivier Mordteau, "Les remedes a l'inexdcution du contrat : Approche thdorique et pratique de 
l'exdcution forcde en droit du commerce international/Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Theoretical 
and Practical Approach to Specific Performance in International Commercial Law" (2017) Revue de 
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become a lingua franca in world affairs and in the context of the European Union, 
a reality likely to survive Brexit.1 25 
When it comes to the rules of conflict of laws, the Hague Conference is taking 
a leading role not only in standardising the terminology but also in establishing 
uniform rules.126 Regarding terminology, one notes that scholars resort to Latin 
when describing, for instance, the law applicable in the jurisdiction where the 
court sits (lex fori), the law applicable to the contract (lex contractus), the law 
of the place where the damage occurred (lex loci delicti) or the law of the place 
where the property is located (lex rei sitae). Latin has the advantage of being a 
dead language: the meaning of words no longer changes, which is much needed 
in a specialty language.1 27 Latin offers a wonderfully stable common and neutral 
language to zoologists and botanists, allowing them to communicate with their 
brethren speaking different languages. Latin terms are broadly used in comparative 
law conferences, which brings us to the kingdom of uselessness. 
(ii) Neutral Words of Uselessness? System Building in Comparative Law 
8Legal science does not have a specialty language.1 2 Legal terms are given a 
normative meaning inside each legal order. They are therefore not suitable for 
comparative work, because there is constant doubt as to whether a term is used in 
a neutral way or with its normative meaning inside a legal system. Developing a 
metalanguage requires imagination and may be done at the risk of being rejected by 
national jurists, who may no longer understand what we are talking about, except 
in the fields of international trade and international law where a common language 
has already developed. 
When doing comparative law in English, we tend to prefer the common law 
lexicon, speaking of the comparative law of torts rather than referring to civilian 
delictual or extra-contractual liability. Why not discuss a law of wrongs, thereby 
125 Barbara Pozzo, "English as a Legal Lingua Franca in the EU Multilingual Context" in Baaij (ed.), The 
Role ofLegal Translationin Legal Harmonization (n.93) p.183 and Olivier Mordteau, "Can English 
Become the Common Legal Language in Europe?" in Rainer Schulze and Gianmaria Ajani (eds.),
4 0 5 
Common PrinciplesofEuropeanPrivateLaw (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003) p. . 
126 Hans van Loon, "The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Asser's Vision and an Evolving 
Mission" [2011] 24 Hague Yearbook of International Law 3 and "Globalisation and the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law" (2000) 2 InternationalLaw Forum 230. 
127 Mordteau (n.125) p.415. Heikki ES Mattila, ComparativeLegal Linguistics: Language ofLaw, Latin 
and ModernLingua Francas(Burlington: Ashgate, 2nd ed., 2013) also prefers Latin. 
128 Jacques Vanderlinden, "Les nouvelles ambitions de la science du juriste. Une langue gdndrale de 
spdcialisation est-elle une utopie?" in Rodolfo Sacco (ed.), The New Ambitions ofLegal Science: Legal 
Anthropology and LegalTraductology (n.4) pp.13, 14 (my translation): 
Legal science ought necessarily to be expressed in a specialty language, in which all elements 
that may be found in legal notions as the result of in depth and rigorous analytical work may be 
formulated in as neutral a way as possible. There are many examples, from high-profile scholars, 
of complaints regarding the lack ofprecision and polysemy of the legal language. However, little 
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using a neutral term and avoiding common law and civil law connotations?1 29 When 
exploring the law of contract, we use the word "contract" in a neutral or generic 
way, whether we refer to common law contracts (agreement plus consideration) 
or contrat,contrattoor Vertrag, agreements that may include gratuitous promises. 
A neutral language may consist of broad meta-terms or meta-categories that 
must be defined for the purpose of the comparison or in breaking down common 
concepts into smaller units, at times resorting to mathematical language and 
inviting for complex equations. It may be a combination of both. Its use would 
no doubt make comparative studies more precise or accurate but also complicated 
to read when consisting of complex equations. Fortunately, we have the option of 
using metaphors when teaching or addressing a general audience, just as scientists 
sometimes do with success.'30 
Vanderlinden has done a remarkable experiment in the context of expectations 
human beings may have regarding landholding.' 3' He reflects on the use of symbols 
and formulae reminiscent of chemistry. 3 2 When I discussed the matter with him, 
he regretted that he could not use three-dimensional representations. Language-
wise, he uses Indo-European roots, and the terms he coins are precise and apt for 
detailed analysis, as are his diagrams here and in other comparative law exercises.' 33 
His efforts are worthy of discussion, and an international conference should be 
convened on the matter. 
My own efforts are nowhere as detailed, as I have tried to define broad meta-
categories to put the basic concepts of civil obligations in perspective rather than 
identifying every molecule as Vanderlinden does. In my work on estoppel and the 
protection of reliance,'34 I attempt to map the law ofobligations moving from a three-
corner approach (contract-tort-restitution) to a four-corner scheme (contract-tort-
restitution-reliance), in an attempt to offer a model that could help compare many 
different legal systems. On my PowerPoint presentations, each corner is identified 
by an initial: E (estoppel) stands for reliance, to avoid confusion with restitution, but 
the key point is that C [contract], T [tort], R [restitution] and E [estoppel/reliance] 
are preliminarily redefined as meta-concepts or neutral terms, not to be confused 
with the corresponding notion in national legal systems. My project was to show 
129 Eric Descheemaeker, The Division of Wrongs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). However, 
whether the European Group on Tort Law will want to be renamed "European Group on Wrong Law" is 
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133 Vanderlinden, Comparer les droits (n.55). 
134 Mordteau, L'estoppel et laprotection de la confiance legitime, Elements d'un renouveau du droitde la 
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Barbara Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2004 (Vienna and New York: Springer, 2005) p.6 0 . 
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that Western legal systems wrestle with issues that occur at the intersection of 
contracts, torts and restitution, a grey zone difficult to map as legal systems do not 
agree on the definition and scope of contract. Liability for medical malpractice can 
be in tort or in contract, as can liability for breach of a pre-contractual arrangement. 
Working from a broad and neutral definition of tort, contract and restitution, and 
adding a broad and neutral category of reliance, it becomes possible to map the law 
of obligations and it gets easier to compare various legal systems, getting a better 
understanding of their solutions, particularly in obscure or grey areas. 
The harmonisation efforts mentioned in the previous sub-paragraph help only 
to some extent but they lack an overall view or comprehensive perspective: some 
groups work on contracts, others on torts, and all neglect defining major categories, 
because legal systems do not agree, while some remain invisible as is the case with 
reliance. 
The challenge is to craft words that can be accepted by other comparatists and 
pass the translation test. Using Latin avoids the need of translating meta-categories 
in various national languages. In the context of my study, one may want to use 
contractus, delictus, restitutioandfactum proprium.'35 
Whether the suggested meta-categories can be used outside the Western world 
remains to be seen, and the work will have to be done by others. I have a sense that 
applied to Chinese law, a focus on praxis, more than on black-letter law, would 
show that the contract corner is much weaker in practice than on paper, business 
relationships being culturally perceived as a continuum rather than the succession 
of a negotiation and a performance stage, separated like two movements in a 
symphony or sonata. Much probably happens in the vicinity of the reliance comer, 
which matches the necessary fluidity of business relations. 
These meta-categories dwell in the mind of the comparatist as a tertium 
comparationis. They are not meant to be substitutes for existing concepts and 
institutions prevailing in legal systems. They are scientific in nature, tools of 
knowledge and understanding. They may be metalinguistic and shape the third 
space identified when discussing translation. 
Whether we discuss a precise neutral language or meta-categories, this is 
aspirational utopia. Many a reader will conclude that it is not worth the effort 
because if jurists have not done it yet, it must be useless. As useless as science 
can be, who guessed that modem medicine would emerge from the Renaissance 
theatres of anatomy and that the efforts of astronomers would one day give us the 
GPS? The problem is that jurists do not like to act as scientists;'36 they fear that 
135 Factumproprium describes actions or omissions that generate reliance. Venire contra factum proprium 
(going against one's own previous conduct) is the Roman law version ofestoppel: Thiago Luis Sombra, 
"The Duty of Good Faith Taken to a New Level: An Analysis of Disloyal Behavior" (2016) 9 Journalof 
Civil Law Studies, 27, 29, 44. See also Alejandro Borda, La teoria de los actospropios (Buenos Aires: 
Abeledo-Perrot, 1993). 
136 Andreas Rahmatian, "Alchemistic Metaphors in Comparative Law: Mixed Legal Systems, Reception of 
Laws and Legal Transplants" (2018) 11 JournalofCivil Law Studies 231, 257-258. 
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they will not be taken seriously or be considered to be out of touch with reality. 
Reliance on unification and harmonisation efforts does not suffice, as they broaden 
but also narrow the horizons of the comparatist. Legal science needs the help of 
anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, etc. who can accompany the efforts of the 
comparatists by lending their language. 
IV. Words of Conclusion? 
The world of comparative law is in constant motion and so are its words. This paper 
tried to define the corpus of the activity, to show that it goes beyond the law as we 
traditionally understand it, to include "do's", practices or policies. The comparative 
process was approached as intimately connected to our cognitive abilities. Then 
followed a step-by-step analysis of what we comparatists do when analysing 
the law of the other: it is to be discovered by immersion and communicated by 
translation. Comparatists, however, often go beyond the study and description of 
foreign systems. They build systems, fabricating or using a common language. 
The challenge for generations to come is to develop a specialty language for legal 
science, with neutral words fit for the study of very different systems and meta-
categories that help towards a better understanding of the legal universe. 
Let us turn to a master of comparative law and language for the final word 
to this paper. Vivian Curran helps us understand that words are our tools, which 
constantly need to be reinvented or perfected: 
As translator of legal meaning, comparative law always has to invent and 
reinvent tools with which to translate. The paradox is that this undertaking, 
however descriptive in nature its ultimate objective may be, requires the 
ability to destroy its own past rigidities and manners of perceiving, its own 
methods of decoding and transmitting, in order to construct a new modality 
of analysis, a new vocabulary better adapted to changed contemporaneous 
meanings in the perpetually chameleon-like world of new presences, 
claims, standards, and influences, in which the legal and extra-legal 
increasingly criss-cross to the point of becoming indistinguishable, and 
whose juncture are the more difficult to perceive to the extent that they are 
unexpected.17 
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